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                                                                       ABSTRACT 
 
The majority of the literature considers that the establishment of stable institutions, providing better levels of 
security of property rights, is the key-factor to economic growth, taking into account the creation of favorable 
conditions to new investments and technological developments, especially considering an environment of 
globalization. In this sense, these “good institutions”, or the so-called good governance, are closely related to 
the maintenance of the status quo, that is, the permanence of political and economic stabilities. On the other 
hand, economic growth requires, in a large way, political and economic changes to allow reforms, to make it 
possible. We verify, using statistical methods as Ordinary Least Squares ( OLS ), Least Square in Two-
Stages ( 2QLS ), Generalized Method of Moments ( GMM ), among others, that, despite the relevance of 
variables associated with good governance, the Brazilian economic growth is related negatively with the 
large numbers of veto players ( agents with power veto) and the same happened to South American and East 
Asian countries. In some cases, the income growth rate is negatively related to the tenure of the veto players 
and their drop rate from the government basis. Thus, the weaker capacity to veto political and economic 
changes were associated to better economic growth rates, which does not mean one must not have 
institutional stability, but points out that the capacity to change the status quo is fundamental to generate 
conditions to economic growth in developing countries.  
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The economic growth has been one of the themes more studied in the social sciences. It is also one of 
the main objectives pursued by the societies, once the increase of the production level allows all to get better. 
Unhappily, not always this happens and the benefits are, a lot of times, distributed unevenly.  
 
  
This way, wider studies and extremely correlated, approaching subjects as development, their social 
impacts and distribution of income also made part of great research projects and intense debates. 
  
It is particularly significant the difference among the economic performances of the countries, being, 
this way, quite difficult to explain as a country as the United States produce proportionally in one week that 
takes one year, approximately, to be produced at a country as Nigeria, as they begin commenting on in their 
article HALL and JONES (1999).As it points out LUCAS (1988), when one begun to think with respect of 
those facts, it is difficult to think regarding something more.  
 On the other hand, a long time ago the Political Economy came tending the theme of the economic 
growth about fundamental point, as it alerts NETTO (2002): " the Political Economy was born with the 
pretension of helping the economical growth of the nations. Their origins more retreated to show with clarity 
the constant concern on the poverty and the opulence of the nations. It is the case, for instance, of Spanish 
Luiz Ortiz ( 1558 ), of Italian Antonio Serra ( 1613 ) , of French Antoine de Montchrétien, author of the first 
Treaty of Political (1615) Economy, of the English mercantilists Thomas Mun (1621), Gerald of Malynes 
(1601) and Edward Misselden (1622), and of the Germanic cameralists, particularly Johann Joachim Becher 
(1668) and  Joseph R. Von Sonnenfels ( 1763 ). All of them took care, explicitly, of "recipes" that (control, 
incentive, regulation) would that would take the states to the opulence."  
 
          These "recipes", which refers NETTO (2002), bring for our discussion some subject-key: 1) why  the 
economic acting of some countries is so different, with some getting to grow its rate so high and other simply 
try mediocre rates, when no negatives? 2) Why don't the governments of these last countries adopt the same 
politics that took the countries of the first group to grow in such an expressive way? and 3) considering this is  
impossible, why some countries have conditions of  adopting success models and others do not?  
  
          As it is known, the so-called new growth theory, developed starting from the works of ROMER 
(1986,1990) and LUCAS (1988) highlighted in a seminal way the roles of the technology and of the 
education as the main decisive factors of the growth, appearing, therefore, such factors as main answers to 
the first question put above. 
  
           Contrarily to the neoclassical model of SOLOW (1956), however, the new models, of the also called 
endogenous growth theory, they don't consider the technological progress as something exogenous, in other 




            Theoretically, many were the ideas developed, since those which emphasized, besides the aspects 
already mentioned (technology and education), several others: the importance of external trade, of the 
inequality level in the distribution of the income, of the role of the infrastructures in the generation of 
productive activities, of the role of the government expenses, among other several factors, pointed out as 
decisive importance to the economic growth process. Obviously, without mentioning the traditional factors: 
physical capital and workforce. 
              Due to the existence of a great amount of factors, pointed out in the literature, as responsible for the 
economic growth process, some authors have concerned in trying to systematize their influences in the 
attempt to explain the phenomenon. 
 
             In this direction, RODRIK (2003), summarizes in two groups of factors: the endowments of factors 
(included in this group, physical capital, human capital and Labor Force) and Productivity, determined 
endogenously.  
 
Associated to those groups of factors and related among them are the external trade and the 
institutions, considered partially endogenous (they are partially determined inside of the economic system, 
having, however, also exogenous conditions), as well as geographic aspects, exogenous to the economic 
system. 
The institutional aspects have fundamental importance above the aspects pointed out, mainly the 
institutional aspects that concern the participation of the State while enterprising of public policies that can 
develop the decisive factors to the economic growth process or to create favorable conditions so those factors 
are developed. 
 On the enterprising side, we can mention public policies that motivate progress in education 
(collaborating for the formation of human capital) and technology. While facilitator, we can mention public 
policies that encourage a favorable atmosphere to stimulate the work and the private investment, in the sense 
that HALL and JONES (1999) call infrastructure.  
 
For institutions, we will follow the simplifying idea of PRZEWORSKI (2004), that the same mean 
rules (previously announced or learned inductively), which the people wait that are following for sanctions 
(centralized or decentralized) in cases of deviations. In our study, the political and economic institutions will 
be considered as variables to be analyzed, in other words, how the rules that administer the political and 
economical relationships can improve the performance of the countries. 
The fundamental role of the institutions for the good economic performance of the countries was 
detached by seminal works, with extremely elucidating historical analyses for the possible causes in the 
different economical performances among the countries, as we can verify in the classic studies of NORTH 
(1981, 1990). 
Corroborating what was said, economist Pérsio Arida, for instance, when being interviewed for the 
book Conversations with Brazilian Economists, BIDERMAN, COZAC and DITCH (1997, p. 333) regarding 
which would be his conception on the subject of economic development, affirmed:  
 
         “The subject is, before anything else, institutional. In other words, what is the institutional and legal 
picture that gives more trust to the agents to accumulate wealth? This is the subject - key. I refer to the 
removal of impediments to the action freedom and recruiting, to the capacity to create markets and to the 
suppression of the threats to the wealth accumulation. Reduce transaction costs I also think it is crucial. It is a 
much more restrictive vision than the usual and certainly more attentive to the institutional and legal picture 
than most of the economists would like”. 
This article presents the following sections: in the next, we will discuss the role of the institutions as 
the fundamental cause of the process of economic growth, as well as this role to the approaches of the 
economic and political sciences, trying to bring complementary aspects and possible existence of gaps in the 
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literature. In the second section, we will analyze the importance of the governance for the growth process, 
still considering the theoretical point of view, and, in the two followings sections, we will bring empiric 
analyses for the Brazilian case, comparing it with countries of Mercosul and of the East Asian, using 
governance and institutional data. Final considerations finalize the work.    
               
           
 2 – Institutions and  Economic Growth 
 
 
           In relation to the discussion proposed in this article, it is important try to systematize the 
interactions between the political and economical institutions and some other variables, as described in 
ACEMOGLU, JOHNSON and ROBINSON (2004), that in some way allows to try to answer us to the three 
questions mentioned in the Introduction of this work and still make possible to look for the development of 
an analysis for the Brazilian case, larger objective of the article. The outline below simplifies the interactions 
between economical variables and politics. We will explain the diagram below, soon afterwards:  
 
 
      POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS t   DE JURE  POLITICAL POWER t 
   
    DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES t   DE  FACTO POLITICAL POWER t 
 
DE JURE  POLITICAL POWER t               ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS t 
                                                                               
 DE FACTO  POLITICAL POWER t            POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS t+1 
 
 
                                                             ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE t 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS t       DISTRIBUIÇÃO OF RESOURCES t+1 
 
                                                     
 
We can observe that the political institutions in the time t (present) influence the so-called de jure 
political power also in the time t, in other words, the power that comes with the capacity to alter the 
legislation, changing legal norms,  and influenced by the molds of the political institutions. The distribution 
of resources in the time t influences the so-called de facto political power that is the associated power, not to 
the legal norms, but to the capacity of, for having more resources, to influence the decisions.  
 
 Those two types of power, in its turn, will influence the economical institutions in the time t and the 
political institutions in the time t+1 (future). For the logic of the outline to conclude is necessary to consider 
that the economical institutions in the time t influence the economical performance in the time t and the 
distribution of resources in the time t+1.Thus, to know how the variables of the system can be altered, it is 
necessary to know how can be altered the behaviors of the political institutions and of the distribution of 
resources in the present.  
 
In other words, if the de jure power depends on the behavior of the political institutions and the facto 
power depends on the distribution of resources and those two types of power will determine the behavior of 
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the economical institutions, influencing the economical performance, of course the political variables will 
determine, in its final analysis, the economic performance differentiated among the countries.  
To try to establish an example, we can think that a reduction in the public expenses could represent a 
series of changes in the economic institutions capable to alter the current economic performance and the 
distribution of resources in the future.  
For that reduction in the public expenses to happen, that is, so that it happens that modification in the 
economical institutions, it will be necessary that modifications occur in the political power, that is, in the de 
jure power, through changes in the political institutions and/or in the de facto power, via modifications in the 
distribution of resources.  
 
This is the Brazilian case in the current moment, accord with some authors, e.g. RODRIK et. al. 
(2004), because the lack of saving would be the main factor limiting the Brazilian growth, in such a way that, 
when the external financing is present, the economy grows, when he ceases, the economy enters in 
stagnation. It would be necessary, therefore, a reduction of the public expenses to reduce this dependence of 
the external financing.  
What does the crucial question settle down, however, it is how the political institutions could be 
modified to make possible the changes in the economical institutions, and in our example, to allow a 
reduction in the public expenses?  
 
The analyses more associated with the economic theory seem to have a lot of limitations to answer 
this question. Even the most recent developments like the one of ACEMOGLU, JOHNSON and ROBINSON 
(2004) and RODRIK et al (2004), for instance, as well as the several models built starting from the   
endogenous growth theory, don't get to explain the mechanisms capable to modify the political institutions. 
 
It fell to the political science to treat better of this subject. Recent Works, however seminal, like the 
one of TSEBELIS (2002), COX and MACCUBINS (2001) and TOMASSI et al. (2006) bring analyses even 
certain point associated. For those authors, it is crucial to notice that the appearance and the maintenance 
(decisiveness and resoluteness, in the concepts of COX and MACCUBINS, 2001) of the government politics 
addressed for the growth, as well as of their characteristics highly favorable, it depends on the result of the 
transactions made in the political "game."  
The political cooperation is, a lot of times, fundamental to take to the effective government politics in 
favor to the economic growth. In the political system, however, as show TOMMASI et. Al. (2006), it is more 
probable, including the Brazilian case, that the political cooperation is happened when: 1) the positive results 
or gains by the non cooperation were reduced; 2) the number of political actors is small; 3) those actors have 
strong intertemporal connections 4) good delegation (an efficient bureaucracy, for instance) techniques exist; 
5) the political actions are broadly observable; 6) it exists good coercion techniques so that the intertemporal 
agreements are honest (an independent judiciary, for instance) and finally 7) the political changes have  room 
in arenas where the properties 1-6 tend to be satisfied.    
 
 The political Brazilian system has strong conditions, given its operation structure, of allowing the 
existence of those conditions, according to MELO et al. ( 2005 ). 
  
This allows us to conclude, though, that even with the mentioned favorable conditions, in case there is 
not cooperation, in other words, if the political forces have a limited capacity to enforce cooperative 
agreements, rigid (no reagents to the economical atmosphere) political rules will be chosen if the conflict of 




Alternatively, in the vision of TSEBELIS (2002), without cooperation, the veto players can impede 
that extremely important policies for economic growth are implemented. On the other hand, the non - 
cooperation can also impede those disastrous policies in the point of view of promoting growth, as, for 
instance, those that harm the safety of the property rights, be put in practice. 
 
  
In the reality, when there is a low capacity to enforce political intertemporal changes, depending on 
the extension of the distributive conflict in relation to the nature of the economic volatility, we can observe 
political agreements highly volatile or policies highly inflexible. That, once again, it can be favorable or not 
to the economic growth.  
 
 
            If the volatile political agreements happen in function of important politics for the growth, as, for 
instance, structural reforms that improve the education system or improve the deficit of the pension system, 
the cooperation lack will have been disastrous for the objective of doing the country to grow. 
   
          On the other hand, if the politics highly inflexible  are established around points considered vital, in its 
maintenance, to motivate the growth, as, for instance, the fiscal control and the safety of the property rights, 
the cooperation lack among the political agents, and the eventual conflict among them, it will have been 
beneficial for the growth process. 
 
Made that discussion concerning the political and economical theories that associate the operation of 
the institutions with the growth process, of course empiric evidence is very useful to show which type of 
political institutions can favor or not to the growth of a country; if more rigid and difficult institutions of 
changing the status quo or the ones that are more adaptable to the processes of changes and reforms.  
 
 
           3 – Governance and Economic Growth  
 
 
The relationship between governance and institutions has been deserving prominence in several 
studies. That relationship is particularly important because if the institutions are the rules that determine as 
the people behave, they then should provide the means (forms of incentives to favor the execution and 
sanctions for the case of noncompliance) that drive the people if they hold in agreement with those rules. 
 
If all of the institutions are having performances indeed well, the people will be behaving in an 
appropriate way in what says respect to all the rules of the society. Good governance and appropriate 
institutions would be, therefore, the same thing.  
            The governance assures that a series of appropriate institutions is present, whether in the public 
sphere, or in the private. In relation to the linked institutional factors to Governance, is necessary to look for 
the own definition in a wider way, as makes KEEFER (2004), for who Governance is associated to two 
groups of factors. 
 
The first group is linked to the answer reactions before the citizens and the capacity of providing them 
with certain basic services as safety to the property rights, and more generally, with rules of the legislation 
(rules of law).  
            The second is associated to the institutions and the government's processes that supply to the 
decisions-makers government incentives to generate efficient answers for the citizens' demands and they are 
related with the democracy, voice of the society, in this kind of situation, and accountability.  
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Be noticed that the first group represents results, that is, corruption and bureaucratic efficiency are 
indicative direct of the lack of appropriate answer to the social demands, and only indirect indicators of the 
lack of government incentives so that those appropriate answers are supplied. On the other hand, the second 
group represents linked concepts to the causality and, therefore, more important.  
 
Another important point to be stood out is the existence of two currents that come with relative ideas 
to the process of improvement of Governance: the first, puts that if there are flaws in the state apparatus, 
giving margin to the appearance of corruption, for instance, reforms in the public administration, such as 
intensifications of auditing and actions of the public prosecution service, or reforms in the financial 
administration of the state, can be implemented in the sense of trying to correct the problems.   
 
 On the other hand, the second current considers that if the flaws are more taken root in the political 
actors' incentives, the reforms will have to be more structural, not meaning, evidently, that it cannot and 
should not be accomplished. 
 It is very common in the research lines associated to Governance, the systematic use of study and 
data supplied by the World Bank to point out, through their works, alternatives of politics for the growth, 
emphasizing the invigoration of the institutional instruments that would favor the international investment, 
through a larger trust in the respect to the property rights and in the correct execution of the rules of the law.  
A subject-key to work in the best way the empiric relationship between governance and economical 
growth is related with the desegregation of the governance concept. In this sense, KAUFMANN, KRAAY 
and ZOIDO-LOBATON (1999, 2002) and KAUFMANN, KRAAY and MASTRUZZI (2004, 2005) present 
works that constituted in great progress in the direction of pointing the governance not as an only concept, 
but a group of variables that should be considered as a whole. 
 
 
In the reality, they show 194 governance measures, of 17 sources, and they divide those variables in 
six categories: voice and accountability, political stability, government efficiency, regulation quality, rules of 
law, or juridical safety and control of corruption.  
 
It is important to notice that a lot of times the countries have different performances with respect to 
the related items. This way, for instance, we can verify that most of the countries of Latin America is getting 
better, comparatively to countries with similar per capita income, their results in relation to the subjects 
related to the voice and transparency and political stability, while they have been worsening in relation to the 
government efficiency, regulation quality, rules of the law and control of corruption.  
 
Many studies that used the method of cross section (sometimes combined with time series), in other 
words, the choice of a group of countries to have their united data in statistical regressions, found a positive 
relationship between the indicators of the so-called good governance and the economic growth. Especially, 
the works, RODRIK et al. (2004) and ACEMOGLU et al. (2004) found significance of the variables safety of 












Some of the chosen institutional variables concern the so-called agents with power veto (veto players) 
capable to avoid the modification of the status quo. In our analysis, that variable is represented by the 
variable CHECKS. That variable is equal to 1 when there is a low level of political competition and it 
receives an additional unitary value when it happens the following events: when a chief of the executive 
exists, when the executive is chosen competitively and when the opposition controls the legislative.  
 
 In the presidential system a unitary value is added for each camera of the legislative, unless the 
president's party has most in the deputies' camera and the system admits closed lists. In the parliamentary 
system the value of the variable receives an additional unit for each party, given that each one of those parties 
is necessary to maintain the majority. Both in the presidential regime as in the parliamentary regime, each 
party that is part of the government coalition and is closer from the opposition adds a unit.   
  
Our basic equation to analyze the impacts of the institutional variables for the economic growth of countries 
will be : 
 
 
 Y it  = a K it + b H it  +  c A it  +  α j I j it  +  εit,   ( 1 )    where :  
 
Y is the rate of per capita income growth, data from PENN TABLES ( 2004 )  
  
K is the rate of formation of physical capital, data from PENN TABLES ( 2004 )  
  
H is an indicator of human capital, represented in this case for the number of years of study, data from  
BARRO and LEE ( 2003 )  
 
A is an indicator of the openness of the economy, in this case, the participation of exports and imports in  
Gross Domestic Production, data from PENN TABLES ( 2004 )   
 
 Ij are the institutional variables, that is, I1 is the variable CHECKS, I2 is the variable POL, and so on, data  
from  de BECK et al. ( 2001 ) 
 
 i  is the number of countries  
 
 j  is the number of the institutional variables     
  
ε  represents stochastic error  
 
            The data on the political variables of the countries, more specifically the related to what was known 
as checks and balances, try to verify how many and which are the decision-makers concerning the public 
policies that will be implemented, or put in another way, how many and which are the agents with power 
veto needed to approve the implementation of these public policies.   
 
That analysis is particularly important because the government policies can harm minorities without 
representation, or with insufficient representation, in the measure that the number of veto players goes 
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smaller. On the other hand, when increases the number of veto players needed to approve these public 
policies, it decreases the probability that the policies contrary to the interests of a certain minority can be 
approved. In other words, the mechanisms known as checks and balance, responsible for analyze and 
approve the implementation of the public policies can facilitate or to hinder such implementations.  
 
In the reality, the implementation of new policies can represent significant changes in the so-called 
status quo, in other words, in the current state on which are the conditions of the public policies at a given 
moment. The changes can happen to benefit the society as a whole and to promote the economic growth, but 
they can also act just to represent specific gains or damages for some interest groups.    
 
 
As it is clear in the analysis of TSEBELIS (2002), as larger the number of veto players, more difficult 
the occurrence of those changes. If the new policies are favorable to the development and to the public 
benefit, they will have more difficulties to be implemented with the largest number of veto players, and in 
that case, the largest number of agents to accomplish the checks and balances will end up harming the 
development process of a country. 
 
 
On the other hand, if the policies have the objective to harm or to benefit specific groups of interest, 
the largest number of veto players will avoid that this happens, being in this case beneficial for the general 
interests of the society, in the measure it avoids that benefits are granted for groups of interest, to the 
detriment of most of the population or that it harms in an unjust way minority groups without representation 
in the veto mechanisms. Also is probable that countries with larger number of veto players have larger 
difficulties of taking measures in response to economic crises.  
 
           So much in the presidential as parliamentary regimes, divergences can exist in relation to approval of 
public policies; in other words, one can has vetoes through the mechanisms of checks and balances. In the 
case of the presidential countries, the larger difficulties will be in the bargains that the executive power will 
have to accomplish with the veto players existent in the legislative, while in the parliamentary countries to 
administer the veto points inside of the coalitions it can be the largest difficulty. The indicators of the World 
Bank - Database of Political Institutions - DPI, presented in BECK et al (2001) are already capable to 
measure those aspects and they will be used in this work. 
 
 The results regarding the institutional variables will be presented firstly for the Brazilian case, covering the 
period 1975 -2004. This period is longer than the one that will use for the cases of the countries of Mercosul 
and Asian East; in other words, cross section with time series, as well as for the governance analyses. In 
those cases, we will use the period 1996-2004, once the relative data to the indicators of governance of the 
World bank only cover the period 1996 -2004. In the Brazilian case, however, for treating of a single 
country, being, therefore, necessary the use of time series to accomplish the statistical regressions, we will 
use a longer period 1975-2004. 












Table 1 – Significance and Signal of the Institutional Variables ( Ordinary Least Square – OLS )  
Brazil ( 1975-2004 )  
Variable CHECKS POL LTVP 
Significant at 1%            _     +   _ 
Significant at 5%    
Significant at 10%    
Source : see appendix  
 
 
For the Brazilian case, as it can be seen in the table 1, above, the regression with usual control 
variables, as physical capital (investments), human capital (years of education) and commercial openness 
(participation of the external trade in GDP), as well as a series of institutional variables contained in DPI of 
the World Bank, it presented the following result:  
 
 The investments were positively related with the growth, with a level of significance of 1%, and 
about the institutional variables it stood out the influences of the variable CHECKS, that represents the 
number of veto players responsible for the mechanisms of checks and balance, negatively related with the 
growth level and significant at the level of 2%, also the variable POL, political polarization, that it represents 
the maximum difference orientation among the pro-government parties, positively related with the growth 
and significant at the level of 2% and of the variable LTVP, that represents the longest mandate among the 
veto players, negatively related with the growth and significant at the statistical level of 6%.  
 
What is possible to observe through the results above is the strong negative relationship among the 
agents with power veto (whether through its number, considering the variable CHECKS, or through its time 
of mandate duration, considering the variable LTVP) and the level of growth of the Brazilian per capita 
income, in other words, as larger the number of veto players and larger their mandates, worsen for the growth 
of the Brazilian per capita income. As for the polarization, we can admit the idea that as larger the difference 
among the political orientations of the parties of the pro-government base, more easily the government can 
negotiate with each one of them separately and more easily to implement their policies. 
 
 To check the robustness of our results, we made the substitution of the variable CHECKS for the 
variable developed by HENISZ (2000), for him nominated of POLCONIV. That variable has for objective to 
verify as one given proposition of government it could be vetoed inside of the political system. He considers 
the agents with power to  veto being the executive, the deputies' camera, senate and judiciary and it adds to 
the agents mentioned the sub-national (in the Brazilian case, States) units.  
 
Chosen the agents with power veto, Henisz develops a space model that incorporates those agents' 
preferences amongst themselves and inside of their own structures. We can observe that the built variable is 
similar to the variable CHECKS, elaborated by BECK et al (2001). It is worth to point out that Henisz used 
the variable POLCONIV to show the relationship between this and the level of external investments and the 
economic growth and he found a direct relationship, in other words, as larger the political stability, measured 
by the variable POLCONIV, the largest the levels of investment and the growth rates.    
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We calculated a new regression for the Brazilian case, using the variable built by HENISZ (2000), in 
other words, the variable POLCONIV as instrumental variable for the variable CHECKS in a regression of 2 
stages least squares, in a similar way to that was done by HENISZ(2000) and we showed that there were not 
significant alterations. When we substituted the variable CHECKS for the variable developed by HENISZ 
(2000) as instrumental variable, the same continues being significant at level of 1% and contributing 
negatively to the Brazilian economical growth, in other words, the idea is reaffirmed that a larger number of 





          The variable LTVP that represents the longest mandate among the veto players continued being 
significant at the level of 1% and contributing negatively to the growth process, in other words, as larger the 
duration of the mandates of the veto players existent in the system, worsen for the economical growth of the 
country. In the same sense, the variable STVP, that represents the shortest duration of the mandate of the veto 
players, in that regression in 2 stages,  it comes significant at the level of 8 percent and (in the regression 
done with ordinary least square  the variable STVP was not significant statistically when we analyzed the 
statistics t of Student) it contributes positively to the growth, in other words, the smallest duration of the 
mandates of the veto players it favored the process of Brazilian economic growth. 
 
           The variable POL continues significant at the level of 1% and contributing positively to the growth 
taxes in Brazil, in other words, as larger the difference of orientation among the parties that are the 
government's part, better for the growth. That result seems to indicate the larger is the difference among the 
preferences of the parties that are part of the government coalition and that they would be, at least at first,  
veto players, more difficult to change the status quo, what could be interpreted as being a point contrary to 
the argument that has been used to explain the most important results, obtained with the empiric tests 
accomplished through the regressions, pointed out until this moment, that is, the more difficult to change the 
status quo (with a larger number of veto players, for instance) worsen for the growth process. 
 
             On the other hand, we can think that with the largest fragmentation among the preferences of the 
parties that give political sustentation to the government, it would be easier for the government to negotiate 
separately with each one of those parties than have to negotiate with an united block every time it had to try 
to approve some change in the public policies. That was our reasoning when we analyzed the also positive 
contribution of the variable POL in the regression done through ordinary least square. 
 
 
The table 2, below, resumes the results obtained through the regression with Least Square in 2 Stages: 
 
 
Table 2 – Significance and Signal of the Institutional Variables ( Least Square in 2 Stages – 2QLS )  
Brazil ( 1975-2004 ) 
Variable POLCONIV LTVP STVP POL 
Significant at 1%  _ _  + 
Significant at 10%   +  
Source: see Appendix  








             In the case of the series composed for Argentina, Brazil and Chile, as shown in the table 2, below, 
the variable CHECKS presented negative sign and statistical significance at the level of 5 percent, standing 
out that the larger easiness of changing the status quo is favoring the economic growth of the countries 
selected. 
 
In the case of the countries of Mercosul, once again, the variable CHECKS, representing the number 
of veto players, was negatively related with the growth of the countries of Mercosul (added to Chile), the  
level of statistical significance was 10%, corroborating the previous analysis that as larger the governments' 
easiness to implement their policies, larger the growth rates. In this case, still stood out the negative influence 
of the commercial opening, significant at the level of 7%, and the investments in physical capital, statistically 
significant at the level of 1%.  
   
For the case mentioned, the equation to be estimated was: 
 
Y it = a K it + b H it + c A it + α j I j it + θ1 εi t-1 + θ2 εi t-2 +θ3 ε it + δ  ( 2 ),  where : 
 
Y, K, H and I are the same variables defined in equation (1)  
  
 i is the number of the country 
 
 j is the number of the institutional variable 
 





             Table 3 – Significance and Signal of the Variable CHECKS ( 1996-2004 ) 
Variable CHECKS Argentine,Brazil 
and  Chile 
Mercosul and Chile East Asian 
Significant at 1%    
Significant at 5 %          −   
Significant at 10%         −            − 





             To the countries of the East Asian, in what it weighs the unavailability of the data for Hong Kong, 
the results to the other countries (Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) showed the positive and significant 
influence at the statistical level of 9% of the human capital and, once again, it repeats the  negative influence 
of the veto players, represented once again by the variable CHECKS, indicating that the smallest number of 
veto players favored to the growth of the countries of the area, and for the variable VPDROP, that indicates 
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that the small percentile of veto players leaving the government favored the growth of the countries of East 
Asian. 
   
 
5 – Governancece and Economic Growth : Empirical Evidence for Brasil, Mercosul and 
East Asian 
 
         
            The indicators of Governance of the World Bank, compiled in the work Governance Matters IV, 
presented in KAUFFMAN, KRAAY and MASTRUZZI (2005) were used in this work. To evaluate the 
impact of the variables of Governance for the growth, we used the following equation to calculate the 
statistical regressions when we worked with groups of countries, that is, when we have data in panel, which 
combine cross section data (countries) with time series (years) : 
 
Y it  = a K it + b H it  +  c A it  +  α j G j  it  +  εt,  ( 3 )   where :  
 
Y is the rate of per capita income growth, data from PENN TABLES ( 2004 )  
  
K is the rate of formation of physical capital, data from PENN TABLES ( 2004 )  
  
H is an indicator of human capital, represented in this case for the number of years of study, data from  
BARRO and LEE ( 2003 )  
 
A is an indicator of the openness of the economy, in this case, the participation of exports and imports in  
Gross Domestic Production, data from PENN TABLES ( 2004 )   
 
 Gj are the variables of Governance, that is, G1 is RL ( Rule of Law ), G2 is RQ, ( Regulatory Quality ), G3 
is PS ( Political Stability ), G4 is GE ( Government Effectiveness ), G5 is CC ( Control of Corruption ) and 
G6 is VA ( Voice and Accountability ). The data were obtained from KAUFFMAN et al. ( 2005 ) 
 
 i  is the number of the country  
 
 j  is the number of the variables of Governance   
  
ε  represents the stochastic error  
 
             For the regressions with the countries of Mercosul and Chile and with those countries and the 
countries of the  East Asian we used an adjustment  of first order AR (1), once it is possible that 
autocorrelation problems can be harming the results. We verified that the adjustment improved the 
explanatory power of the regressions, increasing R2, as well as the levels of significance of the parameters 
analyzed by the statistics t of Student.The equation used in those cases was: 
 
 




Brazil   
 
 
           As it was already explained previously won't be possible to use the governance data just to Brazil, 
once the historical series is much reduced. In order to have an approximate idea, we used the united data of 
Brazil, Argentina and Chile, for the period 1996 -2004. The results showed the positive and significant 
influences, respectively, to the levels of 1 and 4 percent, respectively, of the variables related to the 
governance indicators, Government Effectiveness and Voice and Accountability, results that walk in the 
sense more found in the literature, in other words, indicators of more democracy levels, transparency and 
government efficiency favor the growth process. 
            On the other hand, we verified, unlike what it is usually pointed in the works on growth and 
governance, that the variables Rules of law and Safety and quality of the regulation (regulatory quality) had 
negative and significant associations, both at the statistical level of 6 percent, with the taxes of growth of the 
per capita incomes of Brazil, Argentina and Chile. 
 
             We considered that it should have a relationship between those results and the results presented 
previously that showed an association also negative among the veto players and the growth rates. In both 
cases the variables, so much the institutional ones, as the one of governance, hinder the appearance of 
reforms, once as larger safety's juridical, larger warranty the certainty that the law won't change, even if are 





        For the case of Mercosul, we made an analysis similar to the previous one, adding Uruguay and 
Paraguay in the time series with cross section panel. The results were also similar, standing out the fact that 
the variable rules of the Law,  once again is negative and statistically significant related with the growth 
rates, now at the level of 8 percent. The government (Government Effectiveness) efficiency is, as expected, 




East Asian and East Asian with Mercosul 
  
 
           The results to the countries of East Asian (Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan)  
corroborated the negative relationship among the variable Rules of the Law and the rates of growth of the 
incomes per capita to the countries of the area, this time at a significance level still larger, of the statistical 
point of view, in other words, to 1 percent. In this case, the variables associated with the indicators of 
governance Political Stability and Quality of the regulation, as in most of the literature present a positive and 
significant relationship at the levels, respectively, of 7 and 1 percent.  
 
           When we added the countries of Mercosul to the countries of the East Asian, still forming a time 
series with cross section, the result continues the same in relation to the variable  Rule of , in other words, 
negative and highly significant (at the level of 1 percent) related with the rates of growth of the incomes per 




Summarizing, we can present the principal results at the table below: 
 






East Asian Mercosul and 
East Asian 
RL − ( 1% ) − ( 8% ) − ( 5% ) − ( 1% ) 
RQ       − ( 5% )  +  ( 1% ) +  ( 7% ) 
GE       +  ( 1% ) +  ( 5% )   
VA +  ( 1% )    
PS   +  ( 7% )  





It is fundamental to observe that in all regressions of this work the R2 were very high, as can be seen 
in the appendix.  
 
 
6 – Conclusions  
 
   
 
             Most of the literature considers that the establishment of stable institutions that supply larger levels 
of safety to the property rights is the key-factor for the growth, in the measure that creates favorable 
conditions for new investments and technological developments. In that sense, those good institutions, or the 
so-called good governance, would be associated to the maintenance of the political and economical stability. 
On the other hand, the economic growth requests, in great measure, those political and economical changes 
happen, so in this form, the reforms to make possible the increases in the growth rates are will be 
implemented. In this point we have a deadlock. 
   
             To try to solve it, the empiric help is very important. It was what we did in this work. We verified, 
that, in spite of the relevance of the variables associated with the good governance, the Brazilian economic 
growth, as well as of some countries of South America and of the East Asian, were associated negatively 
with the largest number of veto players (agents with power to veto). In some cases, we observed a negative 
relationship between the growth rates and the largest duration of their mandates and their largest percentile of 
the government's exit. 
 
  
             It also deserves importance the negative relationship among the governance variable, Rule of Law 
with the rates of growth of the per capita incomes, which, in a certain way, it confirms the idea that the more 
difficult it will accomplish the reforms (including the juridical ones), due to the influence of the veto players, 
worsen to implement the necessary policies for the growth. This way, the smallest capacity of vetoing 
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political and economical changes was associated with better growth rates, what doesn't mean that it should 
not have institutional stability, but it points out that the capacity to change the status quo is fundamental to 




               Our results, therefore, corroborate the statement of STEPAN (2004) that "as larger the number of 
veto players in a political system, more difficult will be to reduce the poverty and the inequality through a 
wide system of social well-being." Or, still, the idea of HANSON (2006) that considers important the 
mechanisms of checks and balance, specially to the developed countries, but, considers that those 
mechanisms that constrain the government action has smaller importance for the developing countries than 
the role that the state should carry out while coordinator of the economical process and agent corrector of the 
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 Regression Argentine, Brazil and Chile 
Dependent Variable: Y 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/22/06   Time: 13:37 
Sample: 1 15 
Included observations: 14 
Excluded observations: 1 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
A -0.213074 0.086226 -2.471106 0.0900 
H -0.977049 0.487335 -2.004882 0.1387 
INV 1.241210 0.295887 4.194874 0.0247 
CHECKS -3.420816 1.074645 -3.183206 0.0500 
FRACTOT 12.83359 20.80913 0.616729 0.5811 
LTVP 0.682567 0.531794 1.283516 0.2895 
STVP 0.311342 0.685736 0.454026 0.6806 
POL -3.096908 3.129274 -0.989657 0.3953 
TS -0.346805 0.179155 -1.935778 0.1483 
VPDROP -17.52043 8.093055 -2.164873 0.1190 
VPDROP1 23.69062 7.744731 3.058934 0.0550 
R-squared 0.962546     Mean dependent var 2.032857 
Adjusted R-squared 0.837697     S.D. dependent var 4.927365 
S.E. of regression 1.985079     Akaike info criterion 4.240178 
Sum squared resid 11.82161     Schwarz criterion 4.742294 
Log likelihood -18.68124     F-statistic 7.709722 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.208240     Prob(F-statistic) 0.059759 
 Program e-views 
 
 
Regression for Brazil 
Dependent Variable: Y75 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/23/06   Time: 14:27 
Sample(adjusted): 2 30 
Included observations: 27 
Excluded observations: 2 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
A75 -0.860292 0.524366 -1.640632 0.1268 
CHECKS -2.342771 0.808332 -2.898277 0.0134 
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FRACGOV -0.460115 9.414949 -0.048871 0.9618 
FRACOP -1.792330 5.546959 -0.323119 0.7522 
FRACTOT -26.68806 16.10163 -1.657476 0.1233 
H75 0.452257 2.001867 0.225917 0.8251 
IDPART -0.199232 0.222908 -0.893785 0.3890 
INV75 1.174287 0.325481 3.607850 0.0036 
LTVP -1.224728 0.409457 -2.991104 0.0113 
POL 5.440978 1.539126 3.535109 0.0041 
STVP 1.802062 1.057888 1.703452 0.1142 
TS 0.974055 0.628726 1.549253 0.1473 
VPDROP -5.792838 9.208367 -0.629084 0.5411 
VPDROP1 8.825393 7.248534 1.217542 0.2468 
AR(1) -0.373223 0.249262 -1.497313 0.1601 
R-squared 0.720035     Mean dependent var 1.790000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.393409     S.D. dependent var 3.581717 
S.E. of regression 2.789583     Akaike info criterion 5.189842 
Sum squared resid 93.38126     Schwarz criterion 5.909751 
Log likelihood -55.06287     F-statistic 2.204464 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.612563     Prob(F-statistic) 0.088666 
Inverted AR Roots       -.37 
Program  e-views 
 
– Regression for Brazil with AR(1)  
Dependent Variable: Y75 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/23/06   Time: 11:29 
Sample(adjusted): 1 30 
Included observations: 29 
Excluded observations: 1 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
A75 -0.713654 0.622347 -1.146714 0.2695 
H75 0.378090 2.333000 0.162062 0.8734 
INV75 1.008334 0.376831 2.675824 0.0173 
POL 4.269720 1.740082 2.453747 0.0268 
CHECKS -1.819021 1.019415 -1.784376 0.0946 
TS 0.988960 0.620675 1.593363 0.1319 
VPDROP -8.264979 7.274279 -1.136192 0.2737 
VPDROP1 4.536705 6.613450 0.685982 0.5032 
FRACGOV -4.465083 10.53632 -0.423780 0.6777 
FRACTOT -20.71447 17.89878 -1.157312 0.2652 
FRACOP -1.523886 7.029299 -0.216791 0.8313 
IDPART -0.181839 0.298824 -0.608515 0.5520 
LTVP -0.946170 0.483704 -1.956094 0.0693 
STVP 0.399264 0.972209 0.410678 0.6871 
R-squared 0.530784     Mean dependent var 1.664138 
Adjusted R-squared 0.124129     S.D. dependent var 3.539300 
S.E. of regression 3.312359     Akaike info criterion 5.539470 
Sum squared resid 164.5758     Schwarz criterion 6.199544 
Log likelihood -66.32231     F-statistic 1.305246 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.589862     Prob(F-statistic) 0.307832 




 Regression for Mercosul e Chile 
Dependent Variable: YMERC 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/08/06   Time: 06:21 
Sample(adjusted): 1 25 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
Backcast: -1 0 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
AMERC -0.137015 0.070921 -1.931947 0.0713 
HMERC 0.150238 0.457415 0.328450 0.7468 
INVMERC 0.821196 0.283717 2.894422 0.0106 
VPDROPMERC 4.372032 7.216425 0.605845 0.5531 
LTVPMERC -0.378554 0.247453 -1.529805 0.1456 
CHECKSMERC -1.827712 1.048160 -1.743734 0.1004 
VPDROP1MERC -6.360039 8.152789 -0.780106 0.4467 
MA(1) -0.407954 0.351753 -1.159774 0.2632 
MA(2) -0.575510 0.421018 -1.366951 0.1905 
R-squared 0.525359     Mean dependent var 1.391600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.288039     S.D. dependent var 5.465857 
S.E. of regression 4.611969     Akaike info criterion 6.168900 
Sum squared resid 340.3242     Schwarz criterion 6.607695 
Log likelihood -68.11125     F-statistic 2.213713 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.270043     Prob(F-statistic) 0.083816 
Inverted MA Roots        .99       -.58 
 Program e-views 
 
Regression East Asian 
 
Dependent Variable: YLA 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 08/28/06   Time: 03:48 
Sample(adjusted): 4 15 
Included observations: 8 
Excluded observations: 4 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
ALA -0.001584 0.019674 -0.080501 0.9432 
HLA 1.339419 0.443092 3.022889 0.0942 
INVLA 0.321727 0.153708 2.093110 0.1714 
CHECKSLA -4.173829 1.604145 -2.601902 0.1214 
POLLA 0.352499 3.545168 0.099431 0.9299 
VPDROPLA -22.60609 4.561799 -4.955521 0.0384 
R-squared 0.958691     Mean dependent var 4.495000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.855419     S.D. dependent var 5.827673 
S.E. of regression 2.215903     Akaike info criterion 4.542902 
Sum squared resid 9.820450     Schwarz criterion 4.602484 
Log likelihood -12.17161     F-statistic 9.283157 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.313020     Prob(F-statistic) 0.100095 
Program e-views  
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 Regression in 2 Stages using the Variable POLCON1 as Instrumental Variable for Brazil (1975-2004)          
Dependent Variable: Y75 
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Date: 10/06/06   Time: 03:56 
Sample(adjusted): 2 30 
Included observations: 27 
Excluded observations: 2 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 16 iterations 
Instrument list: A75 H75 INV75 POLCON1 FRACGOV FRACTOT 
        FRACOP LTVP STVP TS VPDROP VPDROP1 POL IDPART  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
A75 -0.911216 0.544149 -1.674573 0.1199 
H75 0.543567 2.120094 0.256388 0.8020 
INV75 1.239722 0.347249 3.570128 0.0039 
CHECKS -3.102895 1.096489 -2.829847 0.0152 
FRACGOV -3.351583 10.15861 -0.329925 0.7471 
FRACTOT -24.39179 17.16064 -1.421380 0.1807 
FRACOP 0.246647 6.100328 0.040432 0.9684 
LTVP -1.315863 0.432915 -3.039539 0.0103 
STVP 2.165012 1.131956 1.912629 0.0800 
TS 0.927880 0.670392 1.384084 0.1915 
VPDROP -2.326287 10.23281 -0.227336 0.8240 
VPDROP1 7.123702 7.097113 1.003746 0.3353 
POL 6.112958 1.723296 3.547248 0.0040 
IDPART -0.153949 0.244105 -0.630667 0.5401 
AR(1) -0.262298 0.241744 -1.085023 0.2992 
R-squared 0.701329     Mean dependent var 1.790000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.352880     S.D. dependent var 3.581717 
S.E. of regression 2.881267     Sum squared resid 99.62043 
F-statistic 2.112709     Durbin-Watson stat 2.567592 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.100635    
Inverted AR Roots       -.26 




















 Regression for Brazil ( 1975-2004 ) using  Generalized Method of Moments  
Dependent Variable: Y75 
Method: Generalized Method of Moments 
Date: 10/06/06   Time: 04:17 
Sample(adjusted): 2 30 
Included observations: 27 
Excluded observations: 2 after adjusting endpoints 
No prewhitening 
Bandwidth: Fixed (3) 
Kernel: Bartlett 
Convergence achieved after: 5 weight matricies, 6 total coef iterations 
Instrument list: A75 H75 INV75 LTVP STVP POL IDPART TS 
        FRACTOT FRACGOV FRACOP VPDROP VPDROP1 POLCON  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
A75 -0.927893 0.292378 -3.173611 0.0080 
H75 1.642784 4.454051 0.368829 0.7187 
INV75 1.195880 0.241944 4.942785 0.0003 
LTVP -1.166680 0.487130 -2.395007 0.0338 
STVP 2.324919 0.577851 4.023386 0.0017 
POL 7.576409 9.523376 0.795559 0.4417 
IDPART 0.016411 0.922469 0.017790 0.9861 
TS 0.252464 4.049136 0.062350 0.9513 
FRACTOT -23.05477 17.97685 -1.282470 0.2239 
FRACGOV 1.160682 28.76806 0.040346 0.9685 
FRACOP 4.217904 24.11792 0.174887 0.8641 
VPDROP 5.136185 21.05720 0.243916 0.8114 
VPDROP1 2.099609 14.31714 0.146650 0.8858 
CHECKS -3.471746 2.434774 -1.425901 0.1794 
AR(1) 0.095209 1.802556 0.052819 0.9587 
R-squared 0.647131     Mean dependent var 1.790000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.235450     S.D. dependent var 3.581717 
S.E. of regression 3.131801     Sum squared resid 117.6982 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.841022     J-statistic 6.67E-12 
Inverted AR Roots        .10 














Regression for Argentina, Brasil e Chile ( 1996-2004 ) -  Governance 
Dependent Variable: Y 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/18/06   Time: 23:19 
Sample(adjusted): 1 15 
Included observations: 15 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
A -0.587682 0.275770 -2.131061 0.0771 
CC 16.04544 8.564838 1.873409 0.1102 
GE 39.95361 11.09259 3.601828 0.0113 
H 0.088982 1.487837 0.059806 0.9543 
INV 0.558957 0.194494 2.873900 0.0283 
PS 4.470144 7.778375 0.574689 0.5864 
RL -38.15884 11.25165 -3.391399 0.0147 
RQ -10.37638 4.623289 -2.244372 0.0659 
VA 13.79541 5.620347 2.454549 0.0495 
R-squared 0.860471     Mean dependent var 2.029333 
Adjusted R-squared 0.674432     S.D. dependent var 4.695699 
S.E. of regression 2.679300     Akaike info criterion 5.092697 
Sum squared resid 43.07190     Schwarz criterion 5.517528 
Log likelihood -29.19523     F-statistic 4.625216 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.668913     Prob(F-statistic) 0.039102 
 Program e-views  
  
 
Regression for Mercosul e Chile ( 1996-2004 ) – Governance  
Dependent Variable: YMERC 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/23/06   Time: 15:52 
Sample(adjusted): 2 25 
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 72 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
AMERC 0.091145 0.066761 1.365253 0.1937 
CCMERC -0.222279 5.062446 -0.043907 0.9656 
GEMERC 14.66657 7.028746 2.086655 0.0557 
HMERC -1.267803 0.858779 -1.476285 0.1620 
INVMERC 0.145832 0.243753 0.598276 0.5592 
PSMERC -0.395705 6.473741 -0.061125 0.9521 
RLMERC -16.07234 8.630555 -1.862260 0.0837 
RQMERC 4.500541 5.629758 0.799420 0.4374 
VAMERC -1.032798 4.092785 -0.252346 0.8044 
AR(1) -0.516159 0.226889 -2.274937 0.0392 
R-squared 0.536861     Mean dependent var 1.078333 
Adjusted R-squared 0.239128     S.D. dependent var 5.342143 
S.E. of regression 4.659843     Akaike info criterion 6.210177 
Sum squared resid 303.9979     Schwarz criterion 6.701033 
Log likelihood -64.52213     F-statistic 1.803165 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.270578     Prob(F-statistic) 0.155673 
 Inverted AR Roots 
 Program e-views 
 
 25 
Regression for East Asian ( 1996-2004 ) – Governance  
Dependent Variable: Y 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 09/13/06   Time: 02:32 
Sample(adjusted): 29 45 
Included observations: 13 
Excluded observations: 4 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
A -0.033757 0.042505 -0.794185 0.4715 
H -0.640136 0.649251 -0.985962 0.3800 
INV 0.473454 0.217532 2.176475 0.0951 
CC -3.277540 12.14604 -0.269844 0.8006 
VA 1.115364 7.094750 0.157210 0.8827 
RL -24.23404 8.841174 -2.741043 0.0518 
RQ 28.21399 7.244910 3.894319 0.0176 
GE -8.953087 9.461710 -0.946244 0.3976 
PS 12.78684 5.404987 2.365748 0.0772 
R-squared 0.878116     Mean dependent var 3.768462 
Adjusted R-squared 0.634349     S.D. dependent var 6.135263 
S.E. of regression 3.709938     Akaike info criterion 5.665868 
Sum squared resid 55.05455     Schwarz criterion 6.056986 
Log likelihood -27.82814     F-statistic 3.602271 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.197228     Prob(F-statistic) 0.115546 
Program e-views 
 
 Regression for Mercosul and East Asian ( 1996-2004 ) – Governance  
Dependent Variable: Y 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/08/06   Time: 10:18 
Sample(adjusted): 2 45 
Included observations: 35 
Excluded observations: 9 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 42 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
A -0.013906 0.016536 -0.840929 0.4087 
C -11.74435 4.912714 -2.390603 0.0250 
H 0.453085 0.624988 0.724949 0.4755 
INV 0.440615 0.143531 3.069825 0.0053 
CC 1.563118 3.099078 0.504382 0.6186 
RL -13.14792 4.937986 -2.662608 0.0136 
RQ 7.754340 4.025397 1.926354 0.0660 
PS 4.710781 3.787784 1.243677 0.2256 
VA -0.745034 3.132729 -0.237823 0.8140 
GE 2.265289 4.101403 0.552320 0.5858 
AR(1) -0.382725 0.215666 -1.774613 0.0886 
R-squared 0.493565     Mean dependent var 1.741143 
Adjusted R-squared 0.282551     S.D. dependent var 5.681026 
S.E. of regression 4.811964     Akaike info criterion 6.231365 
Sum squared resid 555.7200     Schwarz criterion 6.720189 
Log likelihood -98.04889     F-statistic 2.339011 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.216501     Prob(F-statistic) 0.042892 
Inverted AR Roots       -.38 
 
